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 Diversiﬁcation and ownership concentration
November 11, 2007
Abstract
In a mean-variance economy where controlling shareholders can divert proﬁts,
equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A
higher returns correlation reduces the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, giving rise to both
a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls
and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis
supports the predictions of the model. In particular, controlling for measures of
the quality of investor protection, and other structural variables, we ﬁnd that
equity ownership is signiﬁcantly more concentrated in countries where the stock
returns correlation is higher. Moreover the intensity of the relationship between
the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is ampliﬁed by poor
investor protection.
Key words: Ownership concentration, Diversiﬁcation opportunities, Investor
protection.
JEL classiﬁcation:D 8 ,G 2 ,G 31. Introduction
Recent research reveals a number of diﬀerences among countries with respect to own-
ership structure, portfolio allocation, and stock market participation. One strand of
literature argues that these diﬀerences are shaped by the extent of legal protection for
outside shareholders (La Porta et al. 1997, Kumar et al. 1999, La Porta et al. 1999,
Nenova 2003, among others). Poor investor protection allows controlling shareholders
to extract beneﬁts from the companies that they run (La Porta et al. 2000), and the
presence of control beneﬁts is the most common explanation for ownership concentra-
tion and the resulting loss of diversiﬁcation (Zingales 1994, Demsetz and Lehn 1985). A
number of empirical studies show that ownership is more concentrated in countries with
poorer investor protection (see for example La Porta et al. 1998).
The objective of this paper is to contribute to understanding of the diﬀerences in own-
ership concentration around the world by pointing out a missing link between ownership
concentration and shareholder protection: diversiﬁcation opportunities aﬀect ownership
concentration when investor protection is poor.
We consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy with one risk-free asset
and several risky assets that can be interpreted as “ﬁrms”.1 Some investors, the “house-
holds", have no control over any ﬁrm, whereas others, the “entrepreneurs”, have control
over their own ﬁrms. Controlling shareholders obtain higher expected returns than do
non-controlling shareholders because they are able to divert a fraction of the proﬁts
from the ﬁrm that they control. Since the returns on the risky assets are imperfectly
correlated, there are beneﬁts from portfolio diversiﬁcation. The portfolio decisions of all
1Theoretical work in this area is only starting to develop. Most existing models, though, are con-
structed in a partial equilibrium framework with risk-neutral agents (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, Zin-
gales 1995, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000). An exception is the general equilibrium study by Shleifer
and Wolfenzon (2002), which in a risk-neutral environment examines the impact of the endogenously
determined level of investor protection on the ownership structure of ﬁrms that go public.
1individuals - households and entrepreneurs - generate a demand for shares of the assets.
The model determines the fraction of the wealth invested in the risk-free asset and in the
risky assets and, as a result, the ﬁrms’ ownership structure. We show that diversiﬁcation
opportunities, which we measure as the stock returns correlation in a given economy -
the “local market correlation” - matter in explaining portfolio allocation and ownership
structure.
The theoretical model yields several insights. First, proﬁt diversion induces control-
ling shareholders to hold less diversiﬁed portfolios. A higher level of proﬁt diversion
makes controlling shareholders retain both a larger share of the assets that they control,
and a smaller share of the other risky assets than would be required without proﬁtd i v e r -
sion. The ﬁrst part of this result is well known in the literature: for example, Zingales
(1994) observes that there is little reason to hold a large block of shares unless there
are beneﬁts of control. However, low portfolio diversiﬁcation may also arise because of
a second eﬀect that we can capture through our general equilibrium model: the pres-
ence of control rights induces a lower investment in the risky assets controlled by other
entrepreneurs. This theoretical result is consistent with the stylized fact noted by La
Porta et al. (1999) that in general there is no other large shareholder to monitor the
controlling shareholder.
Second, the general equilibrium nature of our model allows us to assess the im-
pact of diversiﬁcation opportunities on ownership concentration, which we deﬁne as the
fraction of the shares of a ﬁrm held by the controlling shareholder with respect to the
shares of the same ﬁrm held by other entrepreneurs. Ownership concentration increases
when diversiﬁcation opportunities decline because, other things being equal, each con-
trolling shareholder invests a larger share of his wealth in the assets that he controls.
2Similarly, when diversiﬁcation opportunities decline, non-controlling investors allocate a
lower fraction of their wealth to the risky assets that they do not control.
Third, the impact of the stock returns correlation on ownership concentration is am-
pliﬁed by poor investor protection. The reason is that the poorer the investor protection,
the lower the cost of sacriﬁcing diversiﬁcation, so that poor investor protection reinforces
stock returns correlation in making it more attractive for controlling shareholders to in-
vest in the assets that they control.
We then take the model to the data and investigate whether diversiﬁcation oppor-
tunities matter in explaining ownership concentration. Our main empirical ﬁnding is
the novel one that ownership is more concentrated in countries where stock return cor-
relations are higher. Second, poor governance ampliﬁes the impact of the stock returns
correlation on ownership concentration. Third, the ability to obtain control beneﬁts
w i t has m a l lo w n e r s h i ps t a k eb e c a u s eo fp y r a m i d sw e a k e n st h ei m p a c to fs t o c kr e t u r n
correlations on ownership concentration. Finally, our results suggest that local market
correlation is a relevant variable in explaining ownership concentration even if we allow
for international diversiﬁcation.
One may argue that the positive relationship between ownership concentration and
stock returns correlation is spurious. A ﬁrst set of objections concern the possibility
that control beneﬁts and public risk-return proﬁles both depend on the strength of
institutions, and this may have biased our empirical analysis. We addressed this issue
by using two-stage least squares regressions to disentangle the impact of stock returns
correlation from the quality of institutions on ownership concentration. This analysis
suggests that one of the channels through which the strength of institutions aﬀects
ownership concentration is indeed diversiﬁcation opportunities.
3A second criticism concerns the possible presence of reverse causality: ownership
concentration may aﬀect stock returns correlations, which therefore may be endogenous.
To investigate the evidence against the exogeneity of stock returns correlations we per-
form a Hausman (1978) test whose results reject the hypothesis of endogeneity of stock
returns correlations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
Section 3 we derive the optimal portfolio, the equilibrium ownership structure, and the
comparative static results w.r.t. stock returns correlations. Section 4 tests the empirical
relevance of our results. Section 5 discusses some extensions and concludes.
2. Model
Consider a two-period economy with n +1assets; assets 1,..,n are risky, asset n +1is
safe. Denote with Ii the investment in asset i. All risky assets have the same expected
gross returns per unit, mi = m. The gross return from investment in risky assets i is
˜ R(Ii)=( m +  i)Ii,w h e r e i is a random variable with E ( i)=0 ,E( i j)=σij >
0,i 6= j. All risky assets have the same standard deviations, σi = σ, and correlation
coeﬃcients between their returns, ρij = ρ,i 6= j =1 ,...,n. It follows that the correlation
coeﬃcient ρ is greater than zero, so that risk cannot be completely eliminated from any
portfolio. We assume that ρ<1, i.e. there are diversiﬁcation opportunities. The rate
of return on the risk-free asset is normalized to zero; that is, ˜ Rn+1 (In+1)=In+1.
There are n+1individuals. Individuals 1,...,n are “entrepreneurs”. Individual n+1
represents the "households" sector, which we will consider as a unique representative
agent. Each individual is endowed with Wj > 0 units of consumption good; the total
endowment is W =
Pn+1
j=1 Wj units of consumption good.
4Entrepreneur i “controls” risky asset i, and only that asset. In turn, a risky asset is
controlled by only one entrepreneur. Which individuals are entrepreneurs and which is
the household, and which asset an entrepreneur controls, are exogenously determined.
Control allows entrepreneur i to divert an amount B (Ii) of the proﬁts realized by the
asset that he controls. Following La Porta et al. (1998) we assume that the eﬀective
amount of proﬁt diversion is the result of the interactions of many factors, among which
are the rules that protect outside investors and the quality of the enforcement of these
rules. There is ample empirical evidence that the scope for proﬁt diversion grows with
ﬁrm size. For the sake of simplicity we assume that proﬁt diversion is the same proportion
of investment for all risky assets, i.e. B (Ii)=bIi, where b ≥ 0. The exogenously
determined parameter b captures the inverse of the shareholders protection common to
all investors in a given economy.2 A large body of literature attempts to ﬁnd measures
of the parameter b starting with the variables Antidirectors rights and Legal reserve
required introduced by La Porta et al. (1998). A description of these variables is
provided in the empirical section. Households are not able to divert proﬁts. All return
on the risk-free asset is paid to outsiders since there is no proﬁt diversion: B (In+1)=0 .
Cash ﬂow rights from asset i, i =1 ,...,n, deﬁned as gross return net of the diverted
proﬁts, are
e Y (Ii)= ˜ R(Ii) − B (Ii)=( m +  i − b)Ii (2.1)
with rate of return e y = m +  i − b − 1 and expectation E(e y)=y. An entrepreneur
investing in the asset that he controls receives both the expected cash ﬂow rights, like
2Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) observe that legal protection may vary across industries (higher in
regulated industries), and may depend on the ownership structure of ﬁrms, e.g. the monitoring of a
second large shareholder may result in a higher eﬀective level of investor protection (Burkart et al. 1998,
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000, La Porta et al. 1999, Pagano and Röell 1998). However, to keep the
model simple, we assume that the level of investor protection is the same for all industries in a given
economy and does not depend on the ownership structure.
5any other shareholder, and the control beneﬁts. The expected rate of return on the risky
assets, m−1, can be split into two parts: the expected cash-ﬂow rights accruing pro rata
to all shareholders, y = m−1−b; the proﬁts diverted by the controlling shareholder, b.




,w i t hy ≥− 1,t h a ti s ,f o ra l li, m+ i >bfor all realizations
of  i, so that insiders can divert proﬁts even if the company performs poorly. Moreover,
the expected rate of return on the risky asset y must be positive (i.e. m − 1 >b );other-
wise storage dominates and the household would not invest in the risky assets. Finally,
to avoid the modelling shortfall that all wealth is invested in the risky assets, we assume
that m − 1 − b is not “too” large.
3. Ownership structure
3.1. The portfolio problem
We consider the problem of a generic individual j that must choose how to allocate his
wealth by purchasing claims on the cash ﬂow rights of n+1assets in order to maximize
his expected utility. We assume that the entrepreneur maintains control regardless of
the shares owned. This captures the idea that shares with multiple votes, pyramids,
voting trusts, cross-ownership arrangements, etc. can shield the controlling shareholder
from the market from corporate control.
We assume that each individual’s preferences are represented by a utility function
Vj deﬁned over (i) the mean, (ii) the variance of the portfolio’s return, (iii) the initial
wealth, and (iv) the level of proﬁt diversion. We also assume that all individuals have
t h es a m er i s ka v e r s i o np a r a m e t e r ,λ.
In the text we present the case with three assets, two of which are risky and one is
safe, and three individuals, two entrepreneurs and one household, leaving the general
6case to the appendix. All the qualitative results and the comparative statics are the
same. Let xji be the proportion of the wealth of individual j, j =1 ,2,3, invested in
assets i,i =1 ,2,3, with the budget constraint
3 X
i=1
xji =1 . (3.1)
The accounting identity linking the individual portfolio shares and the total investment
in each risky assets is
Ii = x1iW1+,...,+x3iW3,i =1 ,2. (3.2)
Denote with μj = xj1y1 + xj2y2 and σ2
j = x2
j1σ2 + x2
j2σ2 +2 xj1xj2ρσ2 the portfolio’s
expected rate of return, and variance per unit of wealth, respectively.










Wj + B (Ij) (3.3)
with B (Ii)=bIi for i =1 ,2, B (I3)=0s.t. his budget constraint (3.1) and the
accounting identity (3.2). We assume that W1 = W2 =1 ,W 3 > 0.
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for i =1 ,2. (3.6)
7The portfolio weights in equations (3.4)-(3.6) have two components. The ﬁrst is
the solution of the classic Tobin-Markowitz mean-variance analysis, which depends on
the expected cash-ﬂow rights and is common to all the investors. The second term
characterizes the diﬀerences among the investors’ portfolio weights. In equation (3.4),
which describes the proportion of the wealth of entrepreneur i invested in his ﬁrm,
the second term is the incentive stemming from proﬁt diversion: the incentive for an
entrepreneur to invest in his ﬁrm is positively related to proﬁt diversion and it is ampliﬁed
by ρ. In equation (3.5), which represents the proportion of wealth that the entrepreneur
invests in the other ﬁrm, the second term is decreasing in the amount of proﬁt diversion
and the eﬀect is ampliﬁed by returns correlation. One can see through the general
equilibrium nature of the model that proﬁt diversion “double counts” on the amount of
wealth the entrepreneur invests in his ﬁrm. This amount is high not only because of
the proﬁt that he diverts but also because the non-controlling entrepreneur will see his
returns reduced by proﬁt diversion if he invests in somebody else’s ﬁrm. In equation
(3.6), which shows the household’s portfolio weights, the second term is decreasing in
the amount of proﬁt diversion.
Despite the presence of proﬁt diversion, as in a classic portfolio problem, the pro-
portion of the household’s wealth invested in the cash ﬂow rights of the risky assets
is positive under the maintained assumption that proﬁt diversion is not so large as to
expropriate the household completely; i.e. b<m− 1. The proportion of wealth that




∂b < 0,j6= i =1 ,2 and
∂x∗
3i
∂b < 0,i=1 ,2.
Each controlling shareholder invests a larger fraction of his wealth in the asset that




ij > 1,i , j=1 ,2. The resulting loss
of diversiﬁcation is oﬀ-set by the higher expected return from the investment in the
8asset that he controls and by the lower total amount of proﬁt diversion granted to the
other entrepreneur. This eﬀect is stronger when the return correlation is higher, as
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1. When the returns correlation increases, each entrepreneur invests a
larger fraction of his wealth in the asset that he controls and a smaller fraction in the
other risky asset. This applies only after some threshold level of correlation has been
achieved.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.2. Equilibrium ownership structure
From the optimal portfolio weights x∗
ij we determine the equilibrium ownership structure
of the ﬁrms. In equilibrium, the supply of funds is equal to the demand for funds, and













2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b)
λσ2 (ρ +1 )
i =1 ,2, (3.8)
and the resource constraint





Note that investor protection aﬀects the ability to raise funds. From (3.8) observe that




∂b < 0,i =1 ,2, as veriﬁed empirically by La Porta et al. (1998) and Cas-
tro, Clementi, MacDonald (2004). Similarly, it follows quite intuitively from (3.8) that
9investment in risky assets declines with diversiﬁcation opportunities;
∂I∗
i
∂ρ < 0.S i n c e
investor protection aﬀects the ability to raise funds it also aﬀects the overall ability to
divert proﬁts (bI∗
i )e v e ni ft h ep e ru n i tp r o ﬁt diversion is ﬁxed to b.
From the optimal portfolio weights and the amount invested in the risky assets we
determine the fraction α∗
ji of the cash ﬂow rights of asset i that individual j owns. An
individual j, that invests a fraction x∗
ji of his wealth in asset i spends x∗
jiWj. Since the
total value of individual j0s holding of asset i, α∗
jiI∗
i , must equal the amount individual
j spends on asset i, the relation between the proportion of wealth invested by individual





















2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b)
+ (3.11)
bρ
(2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b))(1 − ρ)
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− (3.12)
b
(2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b))(1 − ρ)







(m − 1 − b)W3
2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b)
. (3.13)
Equations (3.11)-(3.13) characterize the ownership structure of the assets and yield the
most important insights of the paper.
10We deﬁne concentrated an ownership structure in which the two entrepreneurs do
not hold the same fraction of shares. Our ﬁrst result shows that the optimal ownership
structure is concentrated as α∗
ii >α ∗
ji j 6= i =1 ,2.3







∂b < 0 (and
∂α∗
31
∂b < 0). This result is strictly related to the eﬀect of
proﬁt diversion on portfolio weights. As equation (3.10) shows, ownership concentration
arises not only because the controlling shareholder invests a larger fraction of his wealth
in his ﬁrm (x∗
ii increases), but also because the non-controlling shareholder invests less
in that ﬁrm (x∗
ji increases).
Third, the impact of the returns correlation on ownership concentration is shown in
the following proposition, which sets out our main testable implications.
Proposition 3.2. In the presence of proﬁt diversion (i.e. b>0), when the returns cor-
relation increases, the shares of the controlling shareholder increase (
∂α∗
ii
∂ρ > 0), those of
the other entrepreneur decline (
∂α∗
ji




∂ρ =0 ). Moreover, poor investor protection ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the returns corre-
lation on ownership concentration; in fact, the derivative of
∂α∗
ii




∂ρ w.r.t. b is negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition illustrates the interaction between the returns correlation, owner-
ship concentration, and investor protection. When the returns correlation increases, two
eﬀects ensue: ﬁrst, the controlling shareholder faces a lower loss from forgone diversi-
ﬁcation opportunities from concentrated ownership (he thus invests more in his ﬁrm),
and second, the non-controlling shareholders face a less attractive risky security (they
3Since we have assumed that the household has a diﬀerent level of wealth, its shares cannot be
directly compared with those of the entrepreneurs. Note, however, that in the case of identical wealth
the household holds a fraction of shares intermediate between those of the two entrepreneurs; i.e. when




11thus invest less in it). We stress that the second eﬀect can only be captured because of
the general equilibrium nature of our model.
Furthermore, the impact of diversiﬁcation opportunities on ownership concentration
is ampliﬁed by proﬁt diversion. The poorer the investor protection, the lower the cost
of sacriﬁcing diversiﬁcation opportunities in order to pursue private beneﬁts through
concentrated ownership.
In the absence of proﬁt diversion as in a Tobin-Markowitz world (b =0 ) , diver-
siﬁcation opportunities play no role in ownership concentration, as can be seen from
equations (3.11) and (3.12). Similarly, even in the presence of proﬁt diversion, the share
of the household is not aﬀected by the returns correlation since the household is unable
to divert proﬁts, this being the channel through which correlation aﬀects ownership.
4. Empirical analysis
Our empirical strategy was to regress a country’s ownership concentration against a
measure of the domestic diversiﬁcation opportunities, controlling for a number of factors.
We then determined if and how the estimated benchmark relationship between ownership
concentration and domestic diversiﬁcation opportunities is aﬀected by alternative ways
to extract control beneﬁts and by the possibility to diversify. A detailed description of
the variables used in the analysis and their sources is given in Tables (5.1) and (5.2).
[INSERT Table (5.1) about here]
[INSERT Table (5.2) about here]
4.1. Data
Our ﬁrst measure of a country’s diversiﬁcation opportunities was Local market corre-
lation, a weighted average of correlations of industry stock indexes. We estimated cor-
12relations between industry stock indexes in 38 countries (see Table 5.3) using monthly
returns for the period 1998-2000 from Datastream stock prices.4 The 10 industries in
the Datastream database are: Resources, Basic Industries, General Industrials, Cyclical
Consumption Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumption Goods, Cyclical Services, Non-Cyclical
Services, Utilities, Information Technology, Financial. We calculated the pair-wise cor-
relations among the 10 industry returns and determined the average pair-wise industry
correlation with the market capitalization of each industry index as weights.
For robustness we introduced two additional measures of a country’s diversiﬁcation
opportunities. The ﬁrst was the Pair-wise stock correlation, i.e. the average pair-wise
correlation of monthly returns on single stocks for each country with the market cap-
italization of each stock as weights. This is the direct empirical counterpart of the
correlation coeﬃcient in the theoretical model but it is largely aﬀected by the number of
stocks in the capital market. Our last measure of stock price synchronicity was Morck’s
et al. (2000) R2 based on the CAPM/market factor linear regression. This is the average
R2 (henceforth the Morck R2)o fﬁrm-level regressions of bi-weekly stock returns in each
country in 1995 (see Table 5.3).
[INSERT Table (5.3) about here]
Our measure of ownership concentration was the percentage of the shares owned by
the top three shareholders in the ten largest companies from La Porta et al. (1998),
henceforth denoted as Ownership concentration from LLSV (see Table 5.3). We took
the shares of the top three shareholders as a proxy for the shares of the controlling
4We also considered the correlation based on the ﬁve-year sample 1996-2000, for which a smaller
number of countries was available. The lower number of countries was the only reason why we preferred
the three-year sample. Nevertheless the results of the regressions using the ﬁve-year sample were
qualitatively similar, and we do not report them here.
13shareholder, under the assumption that all the largest shareholders are potentially able
to obtain control beneﬁts.5
Our ﬁrst set of explanatory variables were indicators of the quality of shareholder
protection. We considered two widely used measures: Antidirectors rights, and Legal
reserve required (the percentage of total share capital mandated by corporate law to
prevent the dissolution of an existing ﬁrm) - both taken from La Porta et al. (1998).
Recall that both indexes are proxies for (the inverse of) the proﬁt diversion parameter
b.
Our main control variables are the logarithm of GNP per capita, given that richer
countries may have diﬀerent ownership patterns, and the logarithm of GDP because
larger economies may have larger ﬁrms which may have lower ownership concentration.
We selected these variables after using a stepwise regression procedure that consid-
ered all the statistically signiﬁcant variables6 used in La Porta et al. (1998). It involved
adding and/or deleting variables from the regression analysis sequentially, depending on
the F-value or the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. One of the beneﬁts of this procedure is
its parsimonious selection of the explanatory variables, while one of its shortcomings is
the breakdown of statistical inference. The latter was of concern to us; however, its only
eﬀect would have been to worsen the ability of parsimoniously extracted exogenous vari-
ables to explain out of sample variations. Given that we obtained within-sample results
5As a secondary measure of ownership concentration we took the equally weighted average fraction
of ﬁrm stock market capitalization held by insiders according to Worldscope 2002 from Stulz (2005),
henceforth denoted as Ownership concentration from Stulz.
6The variables used in the stepwise regression procedure were: the logarithm of GNP per capita,
the logarithm of GDP, the Gini coeﬃcient for a country’s income as a proxy of the level of inequality
in society, and several measures of the legal system such as Legal origin dummies (French, English,
German, the omitted dummy being Scandinavian); the four measures of the quality of the legal system
that La Porta et al. (1998) show to be statistically signiﬁcant in their study, namely Antidirectors
rights, Accounting standards, Mandatory dividend (describes whether there are rules that force ﬁrms
to pay dividends) and Legal reserve required.
14that were consistent with previous research and that we had a limited dataset, we believe
that the beneﬁts of using a stepwise regression procedure outweighed its limitations.
Table (5.4) displays the univariate statistics, and tables (5.5) and (5.6) the simple
correlation coeﬃcients for our variables of stock returns correlation, Ownership concen-
tration, and the structural variables.
[INSERT Table (5.4) about here]
[INSERT Table (5.5) about here]
[INSERT Table (5.6) about here]
The univariate statistics show that Local market correlation and Ownership con-
centration diﬀer across countries. The sign of the correlation coeﬃcients for our stock
returns correlation and ownership concentration are largely as expected from our theoret-
ical model. Moreover, Antidirectors rights and Local market correlation are statistically
unrelated; indeed, despite the negative point estimate, the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The same applies to the pair-wise stock correlation and the Morck
R2 variable. The latter result is consistent with the relation found by Morck et al.
(2000).7
4.2. Ownership concentration and diversiﬁcation opportunities
The main prediction of the model is that ownership concentration increases when di-
versiﬁcation opportunities decline. Table (5.7) shows the results of the regression of the
LLSV ownership concentration, against measures of investor protection, and our three
measures of stock market synchronicity, and structural variables.
[INSERT Table (5.7) about here]
7More speciﬁcally, Morck et al. (2000) ﬁnd that Antidirectors rights matter for explaining stock
returns synchronicity in developed countries. We will consider this aspect later when we investigate the
potential endogeneity of stock returns correlations.
15The ﬁrst column of Table (5.7) shows the importance of structural elements of the
economy alone in explaining ownership concentration: in particular larger and richer
economies have less concentrated ownership. The second column shows the importance
of the quality of the legal system of investor protection in aﬀecting ownership concen-
tration. Antidirectors rights and Legal reserve required have a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant relationship with ownership concentration as in La Porta et al. (1998). To
document the extent to which diversiﬁcation opportunities aﬀect ownership concentra-
tion, in the third column we add Local market correlation to the speciﬁcation in column
two. An increase in Local market correlation, all else being equal, is associated with an
increase in ownership concentration. In particular, Local market correlation matters in
that its coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, with the expected positive sign, and its
impact on ownership concentration is sizeable. The estimated coeﬃcient suggests that
an increase of one standard deviation of Local market correlation (approximately +13%
of Local market correlation) is associated with an increase of slightly less than half the
standard deviation of ownership concentration (approximately +6% of ownership con-
centration). The adjusted R2 increases substantially with respect to the regression in
column two. A qualitatively similar conclusion holds if we use Morck R2 or Pair-wise
stock correlation for stock price synchronicity (columns four and ﬁve, respectively).8
8We have replicated the regressions of Table (5.7) with the Stultz measure of ownership concentration,
and the results were qualitatively similar. They are not reported here for brevity. We also considered
also alternative measures of stock returns correlation, such as Equally weighted pair-wise correlation or
the equally weighted correlation measure based on the same number of industries for each country. We
obtained results similar to those presented in Table (5.7) and do not report them for brevity. We further
considered alternative explanatory variables like stock market capitalization over GDP, average market
capitalization of ﬁrms, number of listed stocks, and the results of the regressions were qualitatively
unchanged. The same applied if we included the disclosure variable constructed by La Porta et al.
(2005) or the Opacity measure used by Jin and Myers (2006).
164.3. The intensity of the relationship between diversiﬁcation opportunities
and ownership concentration
We then investigated the model’s prediction that the intensity of the relationship between
the correlation of stock returns and ownership concentration is ampliﬁed by poor investor
protection. In Table (5.8) a measure of investor protection is interacted with Local
market correlation. For this purpose we have constructed a new variable: Directors
rights, which is the negative of Antidirectors rights. The results show that the impact
of Local market correlation on ownership concentration is ampliﬁed by poor investor
protection. The results are robust with respect to the other two measures of stock price
synchronicity used.
[INSERT Table (5.8) about here]
4.4. Pyramids and ownership concentration
The model assumed that the overall amount of diverterd proﬁts grows with the ownership
stake. In many countries, however, it is possible to obtain large control beneﬁts even
with small ownership stakes, for example through pyramids and shares with multiple
votes. In cases where these alternative ways to divert proﬁts are allowed, the impact
of the stock return correlation on ownershipc o n c e n t r a t i o ns h o u l db es m a l l e r . T ot e s t
this conjecture we used the variable Pyramid, which is the percentage of not widely-held
ﬁrms controlled through pyramids at the 20% control level, obtained from La Porta et
al. (1999).
We then regressed ownership concentration against Pyramid, and the set of explana-
tory and other variables used above. The results reported in Table (5.9) show that
the coeﬃcient of Pyramid is positive and signiﬁcant as predicted, thus indicating that
ownership is more concentrated in countries where there are more pyramidal groups.
17Furthermore, the coeﬃcient of Local market correlation has less explanatory power
when the variable Pyramid is included; hence the relationship between Local market
correlation and ownership concentration is weaker in countries with more pyramids.9
[INSERT Table (5.9) about here]
4.5. Diversiﬁcation in an open economy
When conducting the benchmark test of the relationship between ownership concen-
tration and diversiﬁcation opportunities we have implicitly assumed that individuals
can only invest in their own country. In what follows we investigate wether this is a
valid approximation for the problem at hand, and if and how the possibility to diversify
internationally aﬀects ownership concentration.
The removal of capital controls in both developed and emerging markets has led
to unparalleled ﬁnancial openness across the world. Multi-lateral trade rounds, regional
trade arrangements, and unilateral trade reforms have given rise to increased trade open-
ness. However, capital market segmentation is still substantial even in the absence of
strong capital ﬂow restrictions (see, for example, Bekaert 1995, and Nishiotis 2004). The
presence of ﬁnancial market segmentation has been well documented by many authors
(see Stultz 2005, and Bekaert et al. 2007 among others). Financial market segmenta-
tion is largely aﬀected by indirect barriers such as political and liquidity risks, market
ineﬃciencies, information asymmetries, poor corporate governance, diﬀerent risk ap-
petite, and business cycles. These barriers may aﬀect segmentation by limiting both
the ability to attract portfolio investments from foreigners and the investment abroad
of local investors, the well-known home bias. The documented widespread presence of
ﬁnancial market segmentation supports our assumption that the degree of closure of
9When we used Pair-wise stock correlation or Morck R2, Pyramid was again signiﬁcant with positive
sign, but these alternative measures of diversiﬁcation opportunities were not statistically signiﬁcant.
18the economies in our sample is such that the relevant trade-oﬀ for an entrepreneur is
between control beneﬁts and domestic stock returns correlations.
However, even if overall there is evidence of ﬁnancial market segmentation, its degree
diﬀers among countries. We thus sought to exploit the variability of ﬁnancial markets
segmentation in order to determine wether it matters for ownership concentration. Since
investing abroad oﬀers additional diversiﬁcation opportunities, it follows that the link
between ownership concentration and the domestic stock returns correlation should be
established after controlling for market segmentation.
Since the degrees of market segmentation of world equity markets and country open-
ness are diﬃcult to measure, we considered several measures of market segmentation and
openness of a country10. We used the new measure of market segmentation proposed
by Bekaert et al. (2007) based on the deviation of local and global price-earnings ratios
(Lego). For trade openness (Openness) we used the fraction of years during the period
1965-1990 in which the country was rated as an open economy according to the crite-
ria in Sachs and Warner (1995).11 We then regressed ownership concentration against
measures of market segmentation, a measure of trade openness, and measures of the
domestic stock returns correlation and controls for structural variables.
[INSERT Table (5.10) about here]
As column 1 of table (5.10) shows, Lego is statistically signiﬁcant with a positive
sign. This indicates that when local market price-earnings ratios are larger than global
market price-earnings ratios, ownership concentration is greater. However, measures
of the domestic stock returns correlation still have a positive and signiﬁcant sign. We
also considered other measures used in the literature, such as the absolute value of
10Stulz (2005) discusses the many indexes that attempt to quantify the barriers to trade in ﬁnancial
assets and the limitations of these indices.
11For a description of these variables see Table (5.2).
19the deviation of local and global price-earnings ratios, Capital account openness12,a n d
Foreign Direct Investment/GDP, but these are not statistically signiﬁcant. Instead, what
continues to explain ownership concentration are measures of the domestic stock returns
correlation, which have a positive and signiﬁcant sign. Finally, trade openness (column
2) has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on ownership concentration, but the domestic
stock returns correlation remains signiﬁcant with a positive sign. Overall, these results
seem to support the view that the diversiﬁcation opportunities relevant for the problem
at hand are mainly domestic and that measures of ﬁnancial openness do not strongly
aﬀect ownership concentration.
4.6. Endogeneity of stock returns correlations
A potential criticism is that the negative relationship identiﬁed between ownership con-
centration and diversiﬁcation opportunities may be spurious because diversiﬁcation op-
portunities may be aﬀected by institutions. It can be argued that control beneﬁts and
public risk-return proﬁles both depend on the strength of institutions. Indeed Dyck and
Zingales (2004) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) argue that private
beneﬁts of control are caused by weak institutions. Morck et al. (2000), Wurgler (2000),
and Jin and Myers (2006) argue that stock price comovements are associated with weak
institutions and GDP variables. If this were the case our estimation of the coeﬃcient of
the diversiﬁcation opportunities variables would be biased.
Our ﬁrst step toward the correct estimation of the impact of diversiﬁcation opportu-
nities on ownership correlation was to obtain the component of cross country variation
in diversiﬁcation opportunities explained by the quality of institutions and variables
12Quinn’s (1997) capital account openness measure is created from the volume published by the
IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. It is scored 0-4, in half integer units, with 4
representing a fully open economy.
20related to GDP. Second, we determined whether the component of diversiﬁcation oppor-
tunities explained by the quality of institutions and GDP variables aﬀected cross-country
diﬀerences in ownership concentration. Third, we determined whether the quality of in-
stitutions and GDP variables aﬀected ownership concentration also directly, i.e. beyond
their ability to aﬀect diversiﬁcation opportunities and poor investor protection.
To this end we performed two-stage least squares regressions. In the ﬁrst stage the
dependent variable was the stock returns correlation (i.e. Local market correlation, and
Morck R2) and the explanatory variables were English legal origin, which we consider to
be a good exogenous instrument for the quality of institutions (as in La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2006). Moreover, we used the logarithm of GNP per capita, and the
Gini coeﬃcient, as a country’s gross production variables.13 In the ﬁrst-stage regression
we determined the component of diversiﬁcation opportunities explained by the quality
of institutions and GDP variables that we refer to as Explained diversiﬁcation.
We then performed a second-stage regression where the dependent variable was own-
ership concentration and the explanatory variables were Explained diversiﬁcation, and
the variables already included in previous regressions presented in Tables (5.7), i.e. the
logarithm of GDP, the logarithm of GNP per capita, Antidirectors rights, Legal reserve
required.
To determine whether the estimated coeﬃcient of the Explained diversiﬁcation vari-
able was not biased we needed to perform an Overidentifying Restriction (OIR) test
to verify wether the variables that we included in the ﬁrst stage but not in the second
did not aﬀect ownership concentration directly.S p e c i ﬁcally, the OIR tested the null
hypothesis that these variables do not explain cross country ownership concentration
beyond their ability to aﬀect it through the explanatory variables included in the second
13We do not show the results including also GDP because, as in Morck at al. (2000), we found that
diversiﬁcation opportunities are not aﬀected by diﬀerences in country size.
21stage (i.e. Explained diversiﬁcation variable, the logarithm of GDP, the logarithm of
GNP per capita, Antidirectors rights, Legal reserve required, and Expropriation risk).
The OIR test yields a Lagrange multiplier test statistic that under the null hypothesis
is distributed as a Chi-square (m), where m is the number of overidentifying restrictions
(Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). The number of overidentifying restrictions equals the
number of excluded explanatory variables in the second stage but included in the ﬁrst
stage minus the number of endogenous variables included as regressors in the second-
stage.
T a b l e( 5 . 1 1 )p r e s e n t st h eﬁrst-stage least squares regressions with the F-test’s P-value
and the two-stage least squares results on the LLSV ownership concentration measure
with the OIR test. The null hypothesis of the ﬁrst-stage F-test was that the explanatory
variables do not capture any cross-country variation in diversiﬁcation opportunities. In
both the ﬁrst-stage regressions with Local market correlation and Morck R2 as depen-
dent variables we reject the null hypothesis at the 2% level, thus indicating that the
explanatory variables are valid. In the second stage we examined wether the component
of diversiﬁcation opportunities explained by our variables (i.e. the Explained diversiﬁca-
tion variable) explained cross-country diﬀerences in ownership concentration. We show
that, the Explained diversiﬁcation variable indeed enters signiﬁcantly at the 1% level in
both parsimonious regressions 2 and 4. The results are robust to controlling for the log-
arithm of GDP, the logarithm of GNP per capita, Antidirectors rights, and Legal reserve
required (the other variables signiﬁcant in our regressions reported in Table (5.7) and
in previous research by La Porta et al. 1998); see regressions 1 and 3.14 The OIR test
14The results were the same if we included the logarithm of GDP as explanatory variable in the ﬁrst
stage.
22did not reject the null hypothesis that the Gini index, the logarithm of GNP per capita,
and the English origin variables can be excluded from the second-stage regression.15
This analysis conﬁrms that both control beneﬁt sa n dp u b l i cr i s k - r e t u r np r o ﬁles are
aﬀected by the strength of institutions and country gross production variables. Neverthe-
less, it also suggests that one of the channels through which the strength of institutions
aﬀects ownership concentration is diversiﬁcation opportunities.16 These results should
mitigate concerns about the endogeneity of a country’s diversiﬁcation opportunities and
increase the robustness of our result that diversiﬁcation opportunities matter for own-
ership concentration.
[Insert Table (5.11) about here]
4.7. Reverse causality
Ownership concentration might aﬀect the stock returns correlations, which therefore
might be endogenous. To cope with the potential problem of reverse causality we needed
to identify an instrument that aﬀects stock returns correlations but not ownership con-
centration. Our theoretical model suggests that this instrument could be the variance
o ft h es t o c ki n d e xr e t u r n s . N o t et h a tv a r i a n c ea ﬀects correlation by construction, but
not ownership structure, as shown in equations (3.11)-(3.13). To this end we performed
a Hausman (1978) test.
The result of the Hausman test (not reported here for brevity but available from
the authors upon request) rejected the hypothesis that Local market correlation is en-
dogenous. Therefore, the Hausman test failed to reject the hypothesis that the OLS
15The OIR has one degree of freedom when the logarithm of GNP per capita is included in the second
stage and excluded in the OIR test because there is one endogenous variable included as regressor in
the second stage (Explained diversiﬁcation) and there are two excluded exogenous variables (English
Origin and Gini Index). When the logarithm of GNP per capita is excluded in the second stage and
included in the OIR test, there are two degrees of freedom.
16We repeated the above procedure using the Stultz measure of ownership concentration. Since the
results were qualitatively similar we do not report them here for brevity.
23estimations shown in Table (5.7) yielded unbiased and consistent results. Nevertheless,
this evidence is tentative because we used only one instrumental variable and the dataset
is limited.
5. Extensions and Conclusions
This paper has developed a framework to analyze the interactions between diversiﬁca-
tion opportunities and ownership concentration in an environment with control beneﬁts
arising from limited legal investors protection.
We have considered a mean-variance economy where the expected returns for con-
trolling and non-controlling shareholders are diﬀerent because the former can divert part
of the proﬁts. This oﬀers a convenient simpliﬁed framework in which to study the gen-
eral theme of the tension between the need to diversify the portfolio of the controlling
shareholder and the small amount of external ﬁnance that can be raised when there is
ample opportunity to expropriate outsiders.
We have obtained a number of results. First,when stock returns correlations increase,
each controlling shareholder invests a larger share of his wealth in the asset that he con-
trols and a lower share in the assets that he does not control. Second, as a consequence,
ownership becomes more concentrated when diversiﬁcation opportunities decline. This
is because an increase in correlation lowers both (i) the loss of forgone diversiﬁcation
opportunities from concentrated portfolios and (ii) the overall level of control beneﬁts
that non-controlling investors are willing to tolerate to achieve the excess returns on the
risky investments.
Our objective in attempting to integrate analysis of ﬁrms’ governance and owner-
ship structure into a general equilibrium economy with diﬀerent levels of stock returns
correlation has been to show that correlation is an important variable in explanation
24of ownership structure. This theoretical result has been conﬁrmed by the empirical
analysis. Ownership is more concentrated in countries where stock returns correlations
are higher. This eﬀect is weaker in countries where investors are able to retain control
without sacriﬁcing portfolio diversiﬁcation, e.g. through pyramids, and the intensity of
the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is
ampliﬁed by poor investor protection. Local market correlation is still a relevant variable
for ownership concentration even after controlling for international portfolio diversiﬁca-
tion. We have also addressed the concern that the impact of stock returns correlations
on ownership concentration might be spurious because both are aﬀected by institutions.
We have shown that the stock returns correlation is one of the channels through which
institutions aﬀect ownership concentration.
The foregoing analysis can be extended in several directions, theoretical, institu-
tional and empirical. At the theoretical level, the model can be extended to investigate
an economy where entrepreneurs compete on proﬁt diversion in order to attract outside
funds. The more general issue of harmonization versus competition in corporate gover-
nance law across countries can be tackled using our framework. At the empirical level,
our analysis can also be conducted for a cross section of ﬁrms within the same country.
However, deeper understanding of the problems at hand requires better measures of
proﬁt diversion, and control beneﬁts.
25Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3.1
First to be proved is that there is a suﬃciently high level of ρ<1 such that when
b>0 and the diversiﬁcation opportunities decline each entrepreneur invests more in his
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∂ρ > 0. Thus by continuity there exists a ρ, such that
0 <ρ<1, above which the result holds. Second, from (3.5) it is easy to see that
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26The model with n +1assets and n +1individuals
Let x0
j =( xj1,...,xjn) be the row vector of the proportion of the wealth of individual
j,j =1 ,...,n +1 , invested in assets 1,...,n. Using the accounting identity linking the
individual portfolio shares and the total investment in the risky assets
Ii = x1iW1+,...,+xn+1iWn+1,i =1 ,...,n, (5.6)




































where y0 =( ( m − 1 − b),...,(m − 1 − b)) denotes the row vector of the expected rates
of return on the risky assets, ej represents the j−th column vector of the canonical base
in <n,17 and Ω is the n×n matrix of the correlation coeﬃcients between the returns on
the risky assets.18
The terms in the square brackets of (5.7) and (5.8) represent the risk-adjusted rate
of portfolio return per unit of wealth, and the last term of (5.7) represents the proﬁt
diverted by entrepreneur j as a result of the investment decisions of all the individuals.
If the conditions for the invertibility of the matrix Ω are satisﬁed, i.e. if
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with A ≡ (1 − ρ)(1+(n − 1)ρ).
The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimization of (5.7) and (5.8) s.t. (5.6) and the




2xjΩ + bej =0 ,j =1 ,...,n; y − λσ
2xn+1Ω =0 . (5.11)
The vector of the optimal shares of risky assets in the portfolios of the n+1individuals
are
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we obtain the ownership structure. For example entrepreneur i owns α∗
ii of the asset




(m − 1)(1 − ρ)+( n − 1)ρb
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. (5.20)
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31Table 5.1: Variables description
Variables Variables description
Ownership concentration The average percentage of common shares owned by the
from LLSV three largest shareholders in the ten largest non-ﬁnancial,
privately owned domestic ﬁrms in a given country
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998).
Antidirectors An index of various measures of investor protection. It
rights takes value 0 when investor protection is minimum and 5 when
investor protection is maximum. Source: La Porta et al. (1998)
Legal reserve An index constructed by La Porta et al. (1998). It is the
required percentage of total share capital mandated by Corporate
Law to prevent the dissolution of an existing ﬁrm.
Ln (GDP) Natural logarithm of GDP 1995. Source: World Bank and IMF.
Ln (GNP per capita) Natural logarithm of GNP per capita 1995. Source: World Bank
and IMF.
French Origin Dummy for the French Origin of the legal system.
German Origin Dummy for the German Origin of the legal system.
English Origin Dummy for the English Origin of the legal system.
Scandinavian Origin Dummy for the Scandinavian Origin of the legal system.
Local market correlation Country return correlations. Determined by calculating the weighted
average of correlations among industry indexes in the diﬀerent
single countries for the years 1998-2000. The weights are the
market capitalizations of diﬀerent indexes. Source: Datastream.
Morck R2 Average R2 of ﬁrm-level regression of bi-weekly stock
returns in each country in 1995. Source: Morck et al. (2000).
Gini Gini coeﬃcient for income inequality in each country.
When the 1995 coeﬃcient is not available we use the
previous available year. Source: World Bank.
32Table 5.2: Variables description continued
Variables Variables description
Pair-wise stock Country correlations. Pair-wise stock correlations among the monthly
correlation returns on the listed stocks by country for the years 1998-2000 with
the market capitalization of each stock as weights. Source: Datastream.
Openness Fraction of the years in the 1965-1990 period in which the country
is rated open to trade. An economy is deemed to be open to trade if
it satisﬁes four tests: (1) average tariﬀ rates below 40 percent;
(2) average quota and licensing coverage of imports of less than 40
percent; (3) a black market exchange rate premium averaging less
than 20 percent during in the 1970s and 1980s; and (4) no extreme
controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports.
Source: Sachs and Warner (1995).
Lego Lego measures the diﬀerence between a country’s local market
price-earning ratio and the corresponding global P/E ratio, adjusted
for the country’s industry composition. Sources: Bekaert et al. (2007).
Pyramid Measures the percentage of not widely-held ﬁrms controlled through
pyramids at the 20% control level. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).









Argentina 0.53 0.68 na 0.25
Australia 0.28 0.23 0.064 0.10
Austria 0.58 0.51 0.093 0.05
Belgium 0.54 0.53 0.146 0.18
Brazil 0.57 0.62 0.161 0.14
Canada 0.40 0.40 0.062 0.16
Chile 0.45 0.56 0.209 0.18
Denmark 0.45 0.26 0.075 0.08
Finland 0.37 0.48 0.142 0.22
France 0.34 0.53 0.075 0.22
Germany 0.48 0.40 0.114 0.29
Greece 0.67 0.71 0.192 0.33
H. Kong 0.54 0.59 0.150 0.30
Indonesia 0.58 0.55 0.140 0.26
Ireland 0.39 0.29 0.058 0.15
Israel 0.51 0.55 na 0.18
Italy 0.58 0.53 0.183 0.38
Japan 0.18 0.43 0.234 0.17
Malaysia 0.54 0.80 0.429 0.52
Mexico 0.64 0.63 0.290 0.27
Netherlands 0.39 0.37 0.103 0.17
N. Zealand 0.48 0.43 0.064 0.20
Norway 0.36 0.48 0.119 0.22
Peru 0.56 0.26 0.288 0.09
Philippines 0.57 0.65 0.164 0.23
Portugal 0.52 0.61 0.068 0.20
Singapore 0.49 0.60 0.191 0.37
S. Africa 0.52 0.61 0.197 0.22
S. Korea 0.23 0.59 0.172 0.25
Spain 0.51 0.62 0.192 0.28
Sweden 0.28 0.39 0.142 0.21
Switzerland 0.41 0.54 na 0.20
Taiwan 0.18 0.56 0.412 0.32
Thailand 0.47 0.62 0.271 0.18
Turkey 0.59 0.80 0.393 0.56
UK 0.19 0.36 0.062 0.14
USA 0.20 0.41 0.021 0.17
Venezuela 0.51 0.59 na 0.29
34Table 5.4: Univariate statistics of the variables
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min N. observ.
Ownership conc. LLSV 0.45 0.13 0.67 0.18 38
Antidirectors rights 3.03 1.35 5.00 0.00 38
Pair-wise stock correlation 0.23 0.11 0.60 0.05 38
Legal reserve required 0.14 0.20 1.00 0.00 38
Local market correlation 0.52 0.13 0.80 0.23 38
Gini Coeﬃcient 38.89 8.95 59.00 24.9 38
Ln (GDP) 7.55 2.86 15.86 4.97 38
Ln (GNP per capita) 2.25 1.06 3.58 -0.30 38
Openness 0.74 0.40 1 0 38
Lego -0.21 0.25 0.70 -0.70 35
Pyramid 0.26 0.21 0.79 0.00 26
Morck R2 0.17 0.10 0.43 0.02 34
Table 5.5: Correlation between main variables
12 3 4 5 6 7 8
1
Ownership conc.
LLSV 1- 0 . 3 7 a 0.29b -0.25c 0.50a -0.15 -0.49a 0.23c
2
Antidirectors
rights 1- 0 . 1 4 - 0 . 2 8 b -0.13 -0.02 0.09 -0.17
3
Pair-wise
Stock correlation 1 0.14 0.70a 0.46a -0.23c 0.64a
4
Legal reserves
required 1 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.46a
5
Local market
correlation 10 . 1 4 b -0.45a 0.59a
6 Ln (GDP) 1 -0.33b 0.43a
7L n( G N Pp e rc a p i t a ) 1 - 0 . 4 9 a
8M o r c kR 2 1
N . O b s e r v a t i o n s 3 8 3 83 83 83 83 83 83 4
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
35Table 5.6: Correlation between main variables (continued)
Lego Gini Pyramid Openness
Ownership conc.
LLSV -0.30b 0.41a 0.37b -0.44a
Antidirectors
rights 0.13 0.22c -0.40b 0,01
Pair-wise
stock correlation 0.09 -0.18 0.12 -0.07
Legal reserves
required -0.03 -0.34b 0.07 0.11
Local market
correlation -0.09 0.36b 0.38b -0.30c
Ln (GDP) 0.33b 0.11 -0.09 -0.16
Ln (GNP per capita) 0.21 -0.57a -0.03 0.62a
Morck R2 0.14 0.44b 0.12 -0.37b
N . O b s e r v a t i o n s 3 53 82 63 8
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
36Table 5.7: Regression of LLSV ownership concentration on local market cor-
relation, Morck R2, pair-wise stock correlation, investor protection and econ-
































































Number of observations 38 38 38 34 38
F-statistic 9.336a 9.111a 13.699a 8.100a 10.98a
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.467 0.632 0.518 0.574
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
37Table 5.8: Regression of ownership concentration on the product among local
market correlation and investor protection and economy structural variables













































Number of observations 38 34 38
F-statistic 11.291a 8.325a 10.934
Adjusted R2 0.526 0.534 0.518
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
38Table 5.9: Regression of ownership concentration on local market correlation,
pair-wise stock correlation, pyramid, and structural variables (Robust stan-




























Number of observations 26 26
F-statistic 9.493a 8.026a
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.529
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
39Table 5.10: Regression of LLSV ownership concentration on measures of ﬁ-
nancial segmentation, trade openness, local market correlation, investor pro-






































Number of observations 35 38
F-statistic 10.840a 13.404a
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.626
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.




































































































a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 5.11: Two-stage least squares regression - LLSV ownership concentration
measure. In the ﬁrst stage we regress Local market correlation and Morck R2 against
English Legal Origin, the logarithm of GNP per capita (abbreviated as ln (GNPPC)) and
the Gini coeﬃcient and obtain Explained Local market correlation and Explained Morck
R2, respectively. In the second stage we regress Ownership concentration from LLSV
against the Explained diversiﬁcation variable from the ﬁrst stage and the logarithm of
GDP, the logarithm of GNP per capita, Antidirectors rights, Legal reserve required,
and Expropriation risk. The null hypothesis of the Lagrange Multiplier test for OIR is
that the variables included in the ﬁrst stage but not in the second stage do not aﬀect
ownership concentration beyond their ability to aﬀect the explanatory variables included
at the second stage i.e. that the coeﬃcient for the Explained diversiﬁcation variables
estimated in the second stage is not biased. Robust standard errors in parenthesis unless
otherwise speciﬁed.
41